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The Large Civil Aircraft Industry:
Applying Legal Policy-Making
Tools to Accommodate a Changing
Industry
Dennis G. Terez*
Changes in the large civil aircraft industry and the world economy during the
past decade are forcing countries which participate in this industry to adopt new
industrial policies. These policy changes reflect the realization that national
policies which were once successful are now either ineffective or too costly to
implement. Today, solutions to many of the problems which the world's leading
large civil aircraft manufacturers face require policy-making on an international
level.
The focus of this note is on the activities of Airbus Industrie (Al or Airbus) and
the Boeing Company. The two competitors currently dominate the world market
for widebody commercial aircraft and represent trends typical of the industry as a
whole. Both Al and Boeing are experiencing immense changes in business
strategies and market positions, and both rely heavily on exports for successful
business operations.
This note first examines the emergence of Al and identifies some of the legal
and policy instruments which the European governments have employed to make
Al a successful competitor. After a brief discussion of the growing difficulties
with subsidy policies, the note considers European Community legislation for a
common European industrial policy and the creation of a European Export Bank
as possible alternative solutions for maintaining Al's competitiveness.' The note
finally argues that international industrial agreements are necessary legal tools
for effective regulation of the manufacture and sale of large civil aircraft. 2 Inter-
*Dennis G. Terez is a member of the class of 1985, University of Michigan Law School.
I. The note primarily re-examines Community legislation which was proposed in 1975. See infra
notes 43-57 and accompanying text. These proposals offer alternative policy approaches to some of
the difficulties inherent in the large civil aircraft industry.
2. The two primary international agreements which this note examines are the Agreement on Trade
in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 619, T.I.A.S. No. 9620 [hereinafter cited as Civil Aircraft
Agreement], and the commonline agreement which is an exchange of letters signed by France, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany in the latter half of 1981. The primary
elements of the commonline are agreements on minimum interest rates on direct credits for the
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national agreements currently in force show that the Al member countries and the
United States are capable of dealing with certain pressing problems in the indus-
try on an international level. Because the fierce competition between Al and
Boeing and the internationalization of the industry have rendered purely national
industrial policies insufficient, further cooperative international industrial agree-
ments are necessary.
I. IDENTIFYING THE REASONS FOR AIRBUS INDUSTRIE'S SUCCESS
A. Airbus Industrie's Emergence as a Competitor
Al's entry into the world market changed dramatically the shape of the large
civil aircraft industry. France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or
West Germany) registered Al as a groupement d'intgrit economique (GIE)3 in
December, 1970. Al's first aircraft, the A300, 4 made its maiden voyage in Oc-
tober, 1972. By 1975, however, airlines had placed only 40 orders for the new
aircraft.' This slow start for Al was to be expected given the shock of high oil
prices and general hard economic times in the early and mid-1970s. 6
Although no new orders were placed for the A300 in 1976, Al sold or took
options on 56 aircraft during the period of April, 1977 to April, 1978. This
accounted for about 20 percent of the world market for widebody jets.7 With the
exception of some small declines in 1980 and 1982, Al's share of the widebody
market has increased annually since 1976. 8
AI's success did not result in a downturn of Boeing's business. Boeing experi-
enced record years from 1978 through 1981 measured by jet airplane orders. 9
Rather, it was Boeing's own American competitors, McDonnell Douglas and
purchase of large civil aircraft, and terms of repayment. See infra notes 78-102 and accompanying
text.
3. A GIE is a consortium arrangement legally recognized in France under Ord. No. 67-821, 1967
Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Franqaise [JO.] (France) (Ordinance on Economic Interest Group-
ings). See infra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
4. The A300, Al's first aircraft on the market, is a widebody short- to medium-haul aircraft which
can be modified to accommodate between 220 and 345 passengers. For relevant statistics for other
comparable large civil aircraft, see AVIATION WK. SPACE TECH., Mar. 14, 1983, at 125.
5. The various company shares in Al at this time were as follows: Adrospatiale (France)-47.9
percent, Messerschmitt-Bblkow-Blohm GmbH. (Germany)-31.1 percent, VFW-Fokker (Germany
and the Netherlands)-16.8 percent, and Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (Spain)-4.2 percent.
Germany: Carving Out a Major Role in Aircraft, Bus. WK., May 1, 1978, at 44.
6. Boeing was not immune to these economic difficulties. Boeing had invested a record-breaking
3.5 billion dollars in the development of the 747 but recorded no firm orders for the new airliner from
April 1969 to April 1972. Ganz obenauf SPIEGEL, Oct. 1, 1979, at 166. The 1973-74 oil crisis had
also taken its toll on Boeing's orders. See Boeing Co., Current Market Outlook (Apr. 1983). Further-
more, President Nixon's decision to cancel a number of major space and military programs forced
Boeing to make deep personnel cuts.
7. The Airbus Closes in on the U.S. Market, Bus. WK., Apr. 10, 1978, at 37, 40.
8. Al's share of the world widebody aircraft market for the past seven years is as follows: 1976-
three percent, 1977-19 percent, 1978-23 percent, 1979-38 percent, 1980-32 percent, 1981-56
percent, and 1982-52 percent. Airbus Industrie, Briefing (Jan. 1983).
9. See Boeing Co., supra note 6.
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Lockheed, which bore the brunt of Al's incursion into the world civil aircraft
market. 0 In the development of new civil aircraft, the lines for the competition
between Boeing and Al were drawn by the middle of 1983.
It is difficult to identify all the reasons for Al's rapid success in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Some of the causes stemmed from purely business or economic
advantages, which are beyond the scope of this note." The focus here is on the
legal and policy instruments employed by European governments to make Airbus
a viable world competitor in the large civil aircraft industry.
B. Legal Characteristics Benefit Airbus Industrie
Al's organization into a GIE has increased its ability to compete in several
ways. The GIE became a type of business association in French commercial law
through the Ordonnance of September 23, 1967.12 The 1967 Ordonnance aug-
ments the traditional consortium arrangement by incorporating many of the bene-
fits of both a socite (corporation) and an association (typically a non-profit
organization) in a single legal entity.'3 Thus, under the 1967 Ordonnance, the
10. In world market shares of units produced from 1970 to 1979, Boeing's market share was 60
percent, McDonnell Douglas' was 20.7 percent, and Lockheed's was 4.6 percent. From 1980 to 1982,
Boeing's market share was 62.9 percent, McDonnell Douglas' was 20 percent, and Lockheed's was
1.6 percent. For those respective periods, Al's share increased from 7.3 percent to 10.2 percent. See
Boeing Co., supra note 6.
11. Some of the main features of Al products which have lured sales away from U.S. manufacturers
are the fuel-efficiency of Al aircraft, the advanced wing design, and freight room. The economic and
business factors are even more important when identifying the reasons behind Boeing's success.
Because Boeing is not state-owned, government does not have the direct leverage over the company's
management and operations as is often the case in Europe. Nevertheless, there are at least two
governmental policies which have been important to Boeing's success over the years.
Boeing benefits from a significant number of government contracts for the military. Contracts for
military, space, and missile projects amounted to 36 percent of Boeing's total revenues in 1982, 23
percent in 1981, and 15 percent in 1980. BOEING CO., 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1983). This factor is
not unique to Boeing, however.
Boeing's foreign customers also receive loans and credit guarantees from the Export-Import Bank
(Exim Bank). The Exim Bank provides direct fixed-rate loans to eligible foreign customers of
Boeing. The Exim Bank also provides financial guarantees which back up fixed-rate export loans
from private sources of funding. The chief source of private funding is the Private Export Funding
Corp. (PEFCO), owned by 54 commercial banks, seven industrial companies, and one investment
banking firm. PEFCO offers fixed-rate export loans, protected by the Exim Bank's financial guaran-
tees, to Boeing's customers.
Although support from the Exim Bank is important for individual Boeing customers, the amounts
in Exim Bank loans going to Boeing-related purchases are not overwhelming. For the period of
October 1976 through September 1977, loans going to Boeing customers amounted to about 9 percent
of all Exim Bank loans for that period. See EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977
ANNUAL REPORT 31-36 (1978). For the period of October 1981 through September 1982, Boeing
loans were about 5 percent of all loans disbursed. See EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 36-42 (1983). There are, in addition, loan guarantees to Boeing
customers from the Exim Bank.
12. Ord. No. 67-821, supra note 3.
13. The Ordonnance's stated purpose is to assist the French economy in adapting to "new
dimensions of an expanded and unified market implying, from the perspective of many enterprises, a
transformation of their structures and diversification of their methods." Ord. No. 67-821, supra note
3 (translations are the author's).
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GIE allows two or more natural or legal persons to join their resources to increase
the profitability of the separate enterprises constituting the consortium.4 On the
other hand, the members are jointly and severally liable for all debts of the GIE,
and such debts are paid independently by the individual members. 5
The general policy underlying the creation of GIEs nicely fits Al's own objec-
tives. The legislative report accompanying the 1967 Ordonnance noted that the
GIE serves the dual interests of preserving enterprise autonomy and pooling
resources to achieve a common goal.16 This policy favors the Al member states
which specialize in one aspect of production of a large commercial aircraft. By
facilitating specialization on the part of individual consortium companies, the
GIE enables European manufacturers to increase the speed of joint production of
a commercial airliner.'7 This does not translate into lower production costs,
however. '8
One of the most innovative factors of the GIE is the members' freedom to
determine their GIE's operation and structure. 9 The functions and structure of
the GIE are fleshed out through the constitutive contract or articles of association.
Thus, for example, the articles of association can establish the nature of control
over the GIE's management and accounting.2 0 This element alone gives AT more
flexibility in its structure and management than Boeing, which is forced to abide
by the strict rules of American corporate law.
The voting methods of the GIE members can also be detailed in the articles of
association themselves. 2' This is particularly important for Al; its members cur-
rently make decisions by an 81 percent majority vote.22 This method of voting
marks a considerable improvement over the Concorde project which required a
unanimous decision to initiate action.23
Airbus also benefits from having fewer disclosure requirements than does an
14. Ord. No. 67-821, supra note 3, at art. 1.
15. Ord. No. 67-821, supra note 3, at art. 4; see also Airbus Industrie, supra note 8.
16. See Ord. No. 67-821 supra note 3.
17. The division of labor for an A300, for example, i§ roughly as follows:
Manufacturer Production
MBB and VFW most of the fuselage and vertical tail
British Aerospace wings
CASA horizontal tail section
Adrospatiale cockpit, part of the center fuselage, assembly
See Ball, Who's That Chasing After Boeing? FORTUNE, Apr. 21, 1980, at 138, 139.
18. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
19. There are certain administrative registration requirements, particularly the registration of the
articles of association. Additionally, the Ordonnance requires the GIE to have a mechanism for
calling a general meeting of members and to have one or more directors. A GIE usually has four
organs of control: directors, a board of control, general meetings of members, and auditors.
20. Ord. No. 67-821, supra note 3, at art. 10.
21. Ord. No. 67-821, supra note 3, at art. 8.
22. Airbus Industrie, supra note 8.
23. Ball, supra note 17.
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American corporation. Since the members of the GIE can create, within certain
limits, the type of organizational and operational structure they desire, they can
exclude from their articles of association disclosure provisions typically required
of public corporations. For example, Al does not have to publish its accounts
unless the members so decide. 24 Furthermore, French law does not prevent the
parties from agreeing on a secret reglement intdrieur for the internal operations of
the GIE. 25 As long as the original articles of association are not formally modi-
fied, such internal agreements, though binding only on the GIE members, do not
become a part of the public record.
The GIE members are not the only ones who benefit from such privacy. The
participating governments are partially sheltered from the criticism of taxpayers
who feel that the individual governments are spending too much to support
Airbus. Without publication of Al's accounts, the use of individual subsidies
made by the governments is difficult to determine and, thus, not open to public
scrutiny.26 The aggregate amounts of governmental contributions, however, can
be determined through budgetary and other official reports.
Another legal advantage of the consortium arrangement is immunity from
possible antitrust restrictions. Government officials in Europe have been unwill-
ing to impose antitrust limitations on Al's organizational structure. Antitrust
restrictions are an ever-present concern in the United States, and would probably
preclude any joint venture between two of the three leading American civil
aircraft manufacturers.27 Even joint ventures between American and foreign man-
ufacturers might run afoul of U.S. antitrust laws.28
24. The articles of association and certain modifications thereof are published in the Bulletin
officiel des annonces civiles et commerciales (B.O.D.A.C.) through a registration process with
French commercial courts. Ord. No. 67-821, supra note 3, at art. 6; see also 2 G. LAGARDE, DROIT
COMMERCIAL 707 (2d ed. 1980). There are no provisions in French law requiring notice of the GIE's
formation in a legal journal.
25. 2 G. LAGARDE, supra note 24, at 708. For an excellent summary of the GIE, see 2 M.
JUGLART & B. IPPOLITO, DROIT COMMERCIAL, 1100-1140 (2d ed. 1975).
26. See War in the Air, ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 1983, at 12, 13, which takes the position that under
normal market conditions, Al would have collapsed long ago. There were attempts in the late 1970's
to revamp some of Al's accounting procedures. These changes involved the drafting of some prelimi-
nary financial statements, but in 1982 the French equivalent of the General Accounting Office
reported that any financial statements issuing from Al were incomplete, insufficient, and inaccurate.
Rapport au Prdsident de la Rpublique sur l'Activit6, la Gestion et les Rdsultats des Entreprises
Publiques, Journaux Officiels, No. 5033 (1982).
27. See, e.g., U.S. Trade Policy Phase 1: Administration and Other Public Agencies: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 424
(1981) (prepared answers by W. Stephen Piper) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
28. A good example of the American antitrust problem with joint ventures is found in the Toyota/
General Motors joint manufacturing of an automobile. McDonnell Douglas did develop a partnership
with Fokker of the Netherlands for design and development of a new generation of 150 seat aircraft,
the MDFIOO. These plans for a new aircraft were dropped in late 1983. The tendency of American
aircraft manufacturers to enter into limited partnerships or subcontracting with foreign rather than
domestic manufacturers is also illustrated by the fact that the Boeing 767 has major subassemblies
provided by Italian and Japanese manufacturers. See id. at 406, 424. See infra text accompanying
notes 65-67 for a discussion on the general internationalization of the entire industry.
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C. The Policy Tool of Governmental Financial Support
In addition to creating a flexible legal entity for Airbus, the European govern-
ments have supported Al's success through subsidies and export credits. 29 Their
funding levels have been high. In 1980 the German government provided a
budget of some DM 500 million of development credits and financial support for
its civil aircraft industry, with the intention of repeating such annual expenditures
through 1984.30 Of this total, some 68 percent went to Al-related activities, with
approximately 40 percent of this amount going to the development of the then-
new A310. 3' The French government's budget also provides for heavy investment
in Al's development. The fiscal year 1983 authorizations for A300-60032 and
A310 development amounted to FFr 960 million. Total authorizations for A320 33
development amounted to FFr 500 million. These two items accounted for 52
percent of the 1983 French budget for civil aviation programs. 34 Such govern-
mental support, whether in the form of a credit or subsidy, is critical to AI's
success, particularly in the 1980s when development costs alone for a new
commercial airliner can amount to over one billion dollars.
II. PROBLEMS WITH NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AFFECTING
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE
Historically, Europeans have had a difficult time competing against American
industry because of their "cooperative" rather than "unitary" approach. 35 The
Europeans organize major projects by linking together independent national
manufacturers rather than creating one entity. This approach usually results in
national manufacturers and governments insisting that they maintain their own
identities regardless of whether the venture's competitiveness might suffer as a
result.
The creation of Al represents evolution from the traditional cooperative ap-
proach towards a more unitary approach in competing with the Americans. The
1 29. An important consideration is that most of the Al members are state-owned companies. As of
August 1983, two of the Al members, Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale (France) and
Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (Spain), were wholly owned by their respective governments. These
two partners together had a 42.1 percent share of Al. British Aerospace (BAe), which accounted for
another 20 percent of Al, was once wholly owned by the British Government. The situation changed
in 1979 when the British Government reduced its share to 48.43 percent. Deutsche Airbus holds the
remaining 37.9 percent of Al. The Airbus Alliance, ECONOMIsT, Aug. 27, 1983, at 59. The German
concern of Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB), which is not state-owned, currently owns Deu-
tsche Airbus.
30. Bonn Uneasy About Cost of Airbus Program: An Interview with State Secretary Martin
Griiner, 35 INTERAVIA 309, 310 (1980).
31. The A3 10 (basic version) is a medium-haul jet which can accommodate 210 to 265 passengers.
32. The A300-600, a modified version of the A300, is a medium-haul jet which can accommodate
230 to 345 passengers.
33. The A320 is Al's new program which is still on the drawing boards. The aircraft is targeted at
the 150-seat jet market.
34. 37 INTERAVIA 1142 (1982).
35. Vernon, Critical Choices: The Structure of Industry, in WESTERN EUROPE: THE TRIALS OF
PARTNERSHIP (D. Landes ed. 1977).
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GIE's organizational form unifies the separate European manufacturers under one
legal entity. As the 1980s began, however, it became apparent that the European
governments were once again asserting their own identities. Deficits and growing
unemployment required a more cautious approach, at least financially, toward
international ventures on the part of the separate consortium members. This pull
back from the unitary approach is most evident in the area of direct governmental
financial support for Airbus.
A. Difficulties with Subsidy Policies
As early as 1980, the German Government was concerned that the high cost of
Al programs would lead to ever-increasing budgetary outlays by the government.
At that time, the German Government wanted its subsidies to be redirected to the
financing of new aircraft development rather than to the balancing of unequal cost
differentials.36 The recent controversy among the consortium partners as to the
status of the new A320 further illustrates the reluctance of the German Govern-
ment to spend for future Al projects. After debating the issue of whether the new
aircraft should be a twin-aisle or single-aisle jet, 37 the German Government
began questioning the form of production financing that the consortium members
should follow. The German Government has required that Al take a closer look at
the risk involved in designing and marketing an entirely new aircraft in the face
of strong competition from Boeing. Tighter German budgets and more conser-
vative spending have led to its more cautious approach toward participation in a
new Airbus project. 38
The British Government is also re-evaluating its position on the subsidies
question. Before it makes any commitments to financing the A320 project, the
British Government is following the Germans in closely scrutinizing the prof-
itability of a new project, but such a finding is only the first step. British Aero-
space (BAe) must also show that the project deserves governmental support
before other candidates on the government's list. 39 Significant British involve-
36. See Bonn Uneasy About Cost of Airbus Program: An Interview with State Secretary Martin
Gruner, supra note 30.
37. What Next From Airbus, SA or TA?, 36 INTERAVIA 284 (1981).
38. After about two years of negotiations, the German Government decided in February 1984 to
commit $566 million to the A320 project. See infra note 41. The German Government is being
cautious even though it will presumably recoup a large portion of its support through royalties on
aircraft sold. By the beginning of 1982, the German Government had already received DM 130
million from its original development contributions to the A300 project. To meet contractual obliga-
tions with the government, however, Deutsche Airbus has been forced to borrow from private lenders
at high interest rates. Bulloch, Philipp, & Rek, West German Aerospace, 37 INTERAVIA 334, 342
(1982).
39. Because of the restrictive financing posture of the British Government, BAe has been forced to
present the government with a package of options for participation in the new A320 project. First,
there is the possibility of no governmental support, which would effectively mean no British par-
ticipation in the new aircraft program. Second, BAe could go after 20 percent of the project, which
would entail British responsibility for the wings and tail. This option would require 400 million
pounds. The third option of 30 percent participation would entail development of the nose and
forward fuselage section, final assembly, and flight testing. This large share would require 600
million pounds, an amount which BAe could conceivably raise through its own sources but would
necessitate government support for at least the interest payments. 37 INTERAVIA 407 (1982).
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ment in-aerospace projects other than Al may make this second hurdle the more
difficult one to overcome. 40 Like Germany and France, Britain is coming to
believe that its generous industrial policies of the 1970s are ill-suited to the tight
budgets of the 1980s.
A move toward less unitary action by the European governments hurts Al's
competitive posture and defeats many of the advantages gained by having the
flexible legal structure of the GIE. The implication of a less unitary approach is
illustrated by attempts of Al to launch the A320. Airbus hoped to begin produc-
tion of the new model not long after the French had placed an initial order for it in
June, 1981. Production of the new aircraft has yet to begin. The major roadblock
to its development continues to be the lack of an agreement on subsidies and
export credits which consortium members are to contribute. Without firm com-
mitments from the consortium members of financial support for the new aircraft,
the A320 program is not feasible. 4' While the Europeans have been bickering
over which country is to bear the primary financial risk in a new venture, Boeing
has introduced two new aircraft, the 767 and 757.
Excessive governmental involvement in the management and operations of
individual aerospace concerns presents another difficulty with current subsidy
policies. The German Government used its leverage of subsidies and loans ear-
marked for Al development to restructure the entire industry, despite the fact that
the participants in the German aerospace industry are private concerns. 42 Such a
40. Another significant British participant in the aerospace industry is Rolls-Royce, which is
involved in the construction of some of the engines for the Al aircraft.
41. After about two years of negotiations, the German Government finally committed itself in
February 1984 to the A320 by granting $566 million in aid. This amount matches the French
commitment to the project. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1984, at Dll, col. 5 (city ed.) The money will be
repaid at the rate of about one million dollars per A320 sold until 600 aircraft are sold. German
Cabinet Ratifies Funds To Assist A320 Development, AVIATION WK. SPACE TECH., Feb. 27, 1984, at
35. A week later the British Government decided to commit $365 million to the A320 project. One-
fifth of this amount will be repaid at a fixed interest rate beginning in 1990. The remaining amount
will be repaid through a levy on each aircraft sold. British Government Underwrites A320 Share,
AVIATION WK. SPACE TECH., Mar. 5, 1984, at 30.
42. The two dominant German aerospace manufacturers are Messerschmitt-B61kow-Blohm
(MBB) and die Vereinigten Flugtechnischen Werke GmbH. (VFW). Although Bonn wanted to unite
the two for a stronger German presence in the industry, this move was made impossible when VFW
joined the Dutch concern of die NV Koninklijke Nederlandse Vliegtuigenfabriek Fokker (Fokker) in
1969. A short-haul jet project failed for VFW in 1977. The failure of the project cost the German
Government some DM 280 million. In order to keep VFW in business, the German Government was
forced to give the manufacturer an additional DM 110 million. See Up the Airbus: German Aerospace
is Flying High, BARRON'S, June 30, 1980, at 9.
With this additional financing to keep VFW afloat, the German Government started to use its
leverage to force a merger between VFW and MBB. This would, of course, entail a break between
Fokker and VFW. From 1977 through 1980 the German Government tried to exert pressure on VFW
to merge with MBB. The German Government finally restructured the aerospace industry through a
merger between MBB and VFW in late 1980. But to achieve this result, Bonn temporarily cut off
development funding for the A3 10 project and suspended any decision on additional financial guaran-
tees linked to Al. The amounts involved were significant. See MBB and VFW: The Longest Drawn-
Out Shotgun Marriage, 36 INTERAVIA 103 (1981), which reports that the German Government
withheld DM 300 million for A310 development and an increase in loan guarantees from DM two
billion to almost DM three billion.
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governmental role is understandable given the government's own financial risk in
the venture. This involvement, however, often leads to a stronger assertion of
national identity on the part of the manufacturers than before the subsidy was
given, which runs counter to any unitary approach and defeats many of the
advantages which the GIE structure was meant to create.
B. A European Common Industrial Policy
The European governments involved in Al must rely on their own policy-
making institutions to resolve the controversial issue of governmental financial
support for the consortium. Resolving the conflicts with national industrial pol-
icies is critical if Al is to maintain its competitiveness against Boeing. A delay of
one or two years could be catastrophic for sales and the development of a new
aircraft, especially in light of Boeing's unrelenting production rate.
One possible solution for reconciling these divergent views is the legal tool of
European Community legislation. The Community attempted unsuccessfully to
pass legislation on a common European industrial policy for large civil aircraft
before Airbus met with its first successes in the latter half of the 1970s. Such
attempts are worth re-examining because they embody policy changes which
could help the European large civil aircraft industry to avoid some of the obsta-
cles inherent in subsidization. The proposed European legislation would also
move Airbus beyond the limits of its consortium structure to a fully unitary
approach in its competition with Boeing.
In March, 1975, the European Council passed a resolution which sets out two
interrelated policy objectives for the European Community. 43 Foremost in the
Council's mind was ensuring the competitiveness of the European aerospace
industry against leading American manufacturers. 44 The Council noted that the
primary difficulty in meeting American competition was the large expenditures
necessary for launching new aircraft programs. The Council admitted that the
high cost of aircraft development made new programs "dependent on action by
public authorities." 45 The Council also sought to avoid the duplication of efforts.
The member states were called to "coordinate their policies . . . to achieve the
promotion of an improved industrial structure."46
The resolution recognized the importance of joint governmental support in the
43. 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 59) 2 (1975) (Information and Notices) [hereinafter cited as
Council Resolution].
44. The Council recognized in its resolution that "the aeronautical industry is important for the
economic and technological position of the Community in the world; whereas there are problems
facing the industry in meeting external competition." See Council Resolution, supra note 43, at 1.
American competition at this time came from Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Lockheed.
45. See id.
46. Id. With the policies of this Council resolution in mind, one can better appreciate the value of
the GIE to the Al members. The policies which the Council had in mind are the same as those which
the GIE was meant to achieve. Nonetheless, the GIE had its obvious limitations insofar as it was a
creation of French, and not Community, law.
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financing of aircraft programs and sales.47 Unfortunately, the resolution does not
delve into the details of harmonizing such aid from various governments. Joint
aid for aircraft production, however, represents a major concession on the part of
the member states. To place such important funding on the Community level
would represent a major step toward unifying the large civil aircraft industry in
Europe.
The 1975 resolution was followed in the same year by a Proposal for a Council
Decision Concerning the Creation of a Common Policy in the Civil Aircraft and
Aviation Sector, prepared by the European Commission." The Commission's
proposal covers a wide range of objectives going far beyond the Council's 1975
resolution 9.4 Article l(a) of the proposal reaffirms the need for "the establishment
of a common programme for all activities in connection with the manufacture of
large civil transport aircraft including those carried out in collaboration with
manufacturers in third countries." 50 Following the suggestions of the 1975 reso-
lution, the proposed program includes common methods of financing research,
development, and production tooling.5" Unlike the 1975 Council resolution, the
Commission's proposal lays down a schedule for instituting the common financ-
ing policy in the industry.5 2
The European Parliament's amendments to this proposal focused mainly on
Article 3 (common air transport policy) and Article 4 (mechanics of policy
adoption).53 The Parliament recommended that the Commission and Council first
47. Point II of the resolution reads as follows:
Member States recognize that in order to ensure a market for aircraft produced in the Commu-
nity, the demands of competition require, among other things, that competitive prices be
charged and sustained. To this end, and in observance of the Treaty's provisions on State aid,
the Governments concerned shall, wherever a program is carried out jointly in several Mem-
ber States, undertake to examine whether it is possible to grant and harmonize aid.
id.
48. 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 265) 2 (1975) (Information and Notices).
49. The Commission agreed that:
Whereas to this end it is necessary to establish a common policy for the aircraft industry, such
policy to consist in particular of: the establishment of a common program for the develop-
ment, manufacture and marketing of large civil transport aircraft, including activities carried
out in collaboration with third country manufacturers; the establishment of a common basic
research program; the common financing of research, development and production tooling for
specific programs; a Community system of financial support for marketing; and the harmo-
nization of national laws, regulations and administrative provisions dealing with certification
of airworthiness, environmental nuisance, norms and standards....
Id. at 2-3.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id.
52. Article 2 reads:
Aids granted by the State or out of State resources in the areas to be the subject of common
financing in accordance with Article 1 (b) shall be replaced by such a common financing
system within five years from the date when that system is put into effect.
At the end of this period, Member States shall, save as permitted under Article 92 (2) of the
reaty [of Rome], provide no further national aid in these areas.
Id.
53. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 178) 10 (1976) (Information and Notices)
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concentrate on a common industrial policy for the aerospace sector. Once this
was established, a common air transport policy dealing with specific air routes,
schedules, and the like could be enacted.54 The Parliament did not recommend
any amendments to Articles 1 and 2 of the Commission's proposal despite the
radical impact which these two articles would have on traditional state practice in
this industry. The Parliament, serving as the Community's supranational repre-
sentative institution, was understandably satisfied with the unitary approach to
financing proposed by these articles. A common scheme for financing the entire
European large civil aircraft industry would obviously be a major step toward
European unification which the Parliament is dedicated to promoting.
The Economic and Social Committee (ESC), in its opinion on a common
policy for this industry, 5 appears to be the most realistic in its recommendations.
The ESC, in Point 4 of its opinion, recognized that there are relatively technical
parts of a common industrial policy for this sector which can be put into effect
fairly quickly.56 One of these technical provisions is financing arrangements. The
ESC recommended financial alignment in the areas of sales finance (terms, rates,
repayment periods), credit insurance, and insurance against exchange risks.57
C. Weaknesses of Proposed Legislation and One Alternative
Despite possible advantages of a European common industrial policy for the
large civil aircraft industry, proposed Community legislation suffers from a
number of practical weaknesses. The necessary unanimous consensus for enact-
ment of such legislation is not likely in the near future, because not all ten
members of the Community share the strong interest of Britain, France, and West
Germany in this industry. 8 Common research and financing carry the additional
burden of a heavy cost when one considers that new aircraft development alone
can easily exceed one billion dollars. Finally, Community members will proba-
bly be unwilling to yield the large degree of autonomy that the legislation re-
quires. A successful national aerospace industry still brings with it a large degree
of prestige, which would be diminished with a Community project.
An alternative to a common industrial policy in this area is the establishment of
a European equivalent of the U.S. Export-Import Bank. The idea of a European
Export Bank has remained alive within the Community since 1976.19 For Airbus,
this alternative would provide the significant benefit of a coordinated approach to
financing exports in competition with Boeing products.
Admittedly, this proposal addresses only export financing. Because of its
54. Id. at 9.
55. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 131) 1 (1976) (Information and Notices).
56. Id. at 5 (Point 4.2).
57. Id. at 6 (Point 4.2.7). The ESC also mentions the possibility of a European Export Bank to
handle the financing in the aircraft industry (Point 4.2.8). See text accompanying notes 59-61.
58. The jurisdictional bases for enactment of a common Community industrial policy in the large
civil aircraft sector are Articles 84(2) and 235 of the Treaty of Rome. Both require unanimous
approval by the European Council.
59. See, e.g., 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 76) 2 (1976) (Information and Notices); 20 OJ. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 133) 12 (1977) (Information and Notices).
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limited scope, however, this alternative has a number of practical advantages over
a common industrial policy. The financial burden probably would not be as great
on the Community coffers as that accompanying a common industrial policy,
because the export bank proposal does not call for the common financing of such
expensive areas as research, development, and production tooling. Moreover,
Community members would be giving up less autonomy than under a sectoral
industrial policy, because the European Export Bank proposal limits Community
cooperation to export financing and does not extend it to areas of traditional
national decision-making such as research and development. Because of these
factors, achieving even a unanimous consensus for a European Export Bank
would be less difficult than agreement on a common industrial policy. There also
appears to be a new current of support for a European Export Bank.60 Commu-
nity members will probably start taking this alternative more seriously if Al's
success in the aircraft industry begins to slide in the mid-1980s.
61
III. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL TOOLS FOR
POLICY-MAKING
A. Increasing Internationalization and Growing Reliance on Exports
National policies on both sides of the Atlantic have been partially responsible
for two strongly competitive manufacturers of large civil aircraft. Purely national
industrial policies, however, no longer suffice to solve all the difficulties facing
the industry. Both Europeans and Americans are aware of their international
competition for sales to the world's airlines and that sales markets for large
commercial aircraft are becoming more internationalized.
From 1955 to 1970, approximately 65.9 percent of Boeing orders came from
U.S. customers, leaving 34.1 percent from non-U.S. customers. From 1970 to
1982, this ratio reversed itself with 40.6 percent of the orders coming from U.S.
customers and 59.4 percent from non-U. S. customers .62 The European aerospace
industry currently finds itself in the same situation. 63 Seventy percent of Al sales
60. In the early part of 1983, Al's president, Bernard LathiCre, pointed out that the consortium now
needs the European equivalent to the U.S. Exim Bank. The Europeans feel that Al is still lacking the
flexibility in its financing terms which are available through the Exim Bank. Der Flisternde Riese aus
Europa: Airbus, UBERSEE RUNDSCHAU, May 1983, at 27, 29; see also Time for a "European
Eximbank," 38 INTERAVIA 399 (1983).
61. Some evidence of Al's weakness in the world market is given in Lewis, The Faltering Sales at
Airbus, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1983, at 39, col. 3 (city ed.) . See also Hemp, Boeing Gets $640 Million
Qantas Order, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1983, at D4, col. I (city ed.)
62. Boeing Co., supra note 6.
63. For example, the entire German aerospace industry (military as well as civilian) recorded a
turnover in 1980 amounting to DM 6,052.7 million. Of this amount, DM 3,092.7 million, or 51
percent, were exports. 37 INTERAVIA 337 (1982). In 1982, total sales in the British aerospace industry
amounted to about $10 billion. Of this total, just over half was from export sales. AVIATION WK.
SPACE TECH., Mar. 14, 1983, at 111. Exports account for more than 60 percent of the French
aerospace industry's output. Condom, Exports and Technology Transfer, 38 INTERAVIA 423, 424
(1983).
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are to customers outside consortium member countries, even though Al has a
strong market among consortium member airlines.'
Another element of the internationalization of the large civil aircraft industry is
widespread international subcontracting, now common for most major American
and European aircraft programs. For example, Boeing's 767 contains major
subassemblies provided by Italian and Japanese manufacturers. 6 Boeing also
recently announced agreements with three large Japanese companies to study
prospects of designing and building an aircraft to compete with the new A320. 66
On the European side, Al claims that over one-third of the dollar value of an
A300 or A310 is in American-produced equipment. 67
The industry's participants thus have a strong incentive to keep trade barriers
as low as possible because of this internationalization of the industry. This is not
the only incentive which shapes policy choices. Competition is extremely fierce
in this industry, because Boeing and Al are selling similar products to customers
in virtually the same markets. This intense competition causes the individual
national manufacturers and governments to be highly suspicious of their com-
petitors for fear that the other side might somehow gain an advantage in the
industry. Thus, there are conflicting forces affecting policy-making in this indus-
try: one toward free trade, the other toward disruptive tactics to gain a com-
petitive edge.
This increasing competition and internationalization of the industry requires
policy-makers to change past industrial policies. First in the area of tariffs, both
the American and European manufacturers now view high tariffs as a threat to
their respective large civil aircraft industries, but for very different reasons.
Since the late 1970s, Boeing and other American manufacturers have been forced
to realize that the Europeans, along with the Canadians and Japanese, are intent
on developing strong large civil aircraft industries of their own. This raises the
possibility of the future use of protective tariffs by these countries as a tool to aid
their own manufacturers which compete against Boeing. Thus, the U.S. seeks to
eliminate all tariffs before such protectionism can take hold. 68
On the other hand, the Europeans want to ensure the viability of their own
manufacturers by opening up the world markets as much as possible. A first step
in this direction was the removal of the pre-1979 U.S. ad valorem duty of five
percent on airplanes and parts thereof.69 They also sought to remove the fifty
64. See Airbus Industrie, supra note 8. This figure includes orders up to January 1983.
65. Hearings, supra note 27, at 406.
66. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1984, at Dl, col. I (city ed); Boeing, Japan Near Decision on 7-7 Work
Share, AVIATION WK. SPACE TECH., Jan. 23, 1984, at 30.
67. See Airbus Industrie, informational pamphlet distributed by sales office in New York.
68. This danger of future use of protective tariffs is underlined in Trade Agreements Reached in the
Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Communication from the President of the United
States, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1979). This fear of possible protective tariffs was expressed at the
Tokyo Round despite the fact that many of the foreign tariffs erected against U.S. products were often
waived before 1979.
69. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1202 and the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) before
1980. The Schedules were amended by the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and enacting
legislation. See discussion infra and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat.
144.
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percent ad valorem duty on the cost of repair parts, materials, and expenses of
repairs, purchased or performed in a foreign country on a U.S. civil aircraft.70
As long as the industry remains competitive, another U.S. goal must be the
prohibition of governmental subsidization of research and development, market-
ing, and manufacture of large civil aircraft. Boeing does not enjoy such direct
governmental support, but heavy governmental subsidization is critical to AI.71
European policies of heavy subsidization lead to other difficulties which Amer-
ican policy-makers must face. Overzealous involvement by European govern-
ments to ensure, for example, successful marketing of Al aircraft disadvantages
Boeing. There have been accusations that the French Government has aided the
marketing of Al products, particularly in the Middle East, through the use of a
head of state to promote a new aircraft.72 Testimony at congressional hearings has
also revealed evidence suggesting that European governments supporting Al have
tied aircraft purchases to such political agreements as trade agreements, the
awarding of landing rights, and the sale of military equipment.73 Such govern-
mental involvement obviously threatens Boeing's market share.
Governmental subsidization also requires Boeing to face a market where the
competitor's product is being priced under cost. Boeing recently alleged that the
European governments subsidize more than one quarter of the price of each
Airbus . 4 Boeing bases this allegation on the theory that both itself and Al start at
approximately the same point when it comes to the design and development of a
new aircraft. These initial start-up costs range from one to three billion dollars.
Al, however, cannot be expected to have the same economies of scale as Boeing.
Boeing estimates that by the time the 500th unit is built, the number of man-
hours per aircraft is one-fourth the amount needed at the beginning of the produc-
tion cycle. 75 Al incurs the additional costs of production across borders and of a
slower method of overall production than Boeing's. It also sells far fewer aircraft
than does the American firm. By the end of December, 1983, total Airbus
deliveries reached 240 aircraft.76 In addition, Al's indirect costs (administrative,
quality control, miscellaneous charges) account for more than 70 percent of the
total production costs. Such indirect costs for Boeing account for only 28 percent
70. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1466. This section was amended by the Agreement on rade in Civil
Aircraft and enacting legislation. See discussion infra and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144.
71. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. The problem of heavy governmental subsidiza-
tion on the part of the Europeans, and the other practices which grow out of subsidy policies,
continues to be a concern of American policy makers. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 27, at 404.
72. A good account of some of the alleged political leverage the French Government exerts on
purchasers of Al products is given in J. NEWHOUSE, THE SPORTY GAME 900-99 (1982). Newhouse
believes, however, that Boeing is often too hasty to draw conclusions that the French Government is
directly influencing the purchasing strategies of Middle East nations. Id. at 39.
73. See Overview of U.S. International Competitiveness: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97 Cong., 2d Sess.
273 (1981, 1982) (Appendix 2: Responses to Questions Posed to Mr. Harr in the Subcommittee's
Letter of Invitation).
74. Boeing and AN. Other?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 1983, at 58.
75. Id.
76. Airbus Logs 30 Transport Sales in 1983, AVIATION WK. SPACE TECH., Jan 2, 1984, at 29.
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of total production costs.77 Despite these differences in production costs, AI still
manages to sell its products at a price competitive with Boeing. Boeing therefore
concludes that Al's prices reflect hidden subsidies.
Only international cooperation can effectively resolve such problems as pro-
tective tariffs or exertion of undue influence by governments on aircraft pur-
chasers. The United States and the European governments supporting Al have
used two types of international agreements for policy-making in the industry.
Although these agreements are not a panacea for all of the industry's ills, they do
provide some framework for cooperation between the two competitors. Wholly
apart from their success as legal tools, these agreements illustrate the need
perceived by the countries involved to move beyond the national level to the
international level when analyzing and formulating policies in this industry.
B. The Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft
The most far-reaching formulation of a coherent industrial policy in the area of
large civil aircraft through the use of a major treaty arose from the Tokyo Round
of the multilateral trade negotiations within the framework of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). On April 12, 1979, the United States, the
European Economic Community, and other GATT members7" signed the Agree-
ment on Trade in Civil Aircraft (Civil Aircraft Agreement).7 9
Virtually all of the policy issues which have arisen because of the increasing
competitiveness and internationalization of the industry have been addressed in
either the Civil Aircraft Agreement or subsequent multilateral negotiations. 0
Article 2 of the Civil Aircraft Agreement takes the major step of eliminating by
January 1, 1980 all customs duties and other charges levied on products used in
77. 36 INTERAVIA 851 (1981).
78. As of January I, 1982, the official parties to the Civil Aircraft Agreement were: Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, EEC, France, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West
Germany.
79. Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 2. The signatories noted in the preamble that they were
"mindful of the importance in the civil aircraft sector of their overall mutual economic and trade
interests" and also recognized that "many Signatories view the aircraft sector as a particularly
important component of economic and industrial policy." Id. at preamble. U.S. obligations under the
Civil Aircraft Agreement were codified in the U.S. Code through enactment of the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 95-102. This note deals specifically with Articles 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, and 8. Article I specifies that the Civil Aircraft Agreement covers:
(a) all civil aircraft,
(b) all civil aircraft engines and their parts and components,
(c) all other parts, components, and sub-assemblies of civil aircraft,
(d) all ground flight simulators and their parts and components,
whether used as original or replacement equipment in the manufacture, repair, mainte-
nance, rebuilding, modification or conversion of civil aircraft.
Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 1.
Article 7 prohibits encouragement of action by regional and local governments which would be
inconsistent with the Civil Aircraft Agreement. Article 9 deals with the formalities of the entry into
force of the Civil Aircraft Agreement. Id. at art. 9.
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the manufacture, repair, maintenance, rebuilding, modification, or conversion of
civil aircraft. Article 3 applies the GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade8' to trade in civil aircraft. Article 5 prohibits quantitative restrictions and
licensing requirements applied to exports and imports in a manner inconsistent
with applicable provisions of the GATT.
Article 4 addresses the problem of direct governmental influence on the pur-
chase of large civil aircraft. Article 4 sets down the general policy that purchasers
of civil aircraft should be free to select suppliers on the basis of commercial and
technological factors.82 In pursuit of this policy, the signatories to the Civil
Aircraft Agreement undertake certain obligations. First, the signatories agree not
to require airlines, aircraft manufacturers, or other entities engaged in the pur-
chase of civil aircraft to procure civil aircraft from any particular source. Sig-
natories are also prohibited from exerting "unreasonable pressure" on
manufacturers and purchasers to encourage particular sales.83 Second, the sig-
natories agree that the purchase of products covered by the Civil Aircraft Agree-
ment should be made only on competitive price, quality and delivery basis.
Certain requirements for procurement contracts are stipulated.8 4 Third, the sig-
natories agree to avoid attaching inducements of any kind to the sale or purchase
of civil aircraft from any particular source which would discriminate against
suppliers from any signatory.85
All of the Article 4 obligations address U.S. (and thus Boeing's) concerns over
the involvement of European governments in the promotion and sale of Al
aircraft, by limiting the influence which governments can exert over potential
purchasers of Al aircraft. The U.S. acting alone would not have been able to
promulgate this policy through its own national laws.
Article 6 addresses the troublesome issue of the role governmental subsidies
should be allowed to play in the industry. 86 The first paragraph of Article 6 deals
specifically with injuries to a signatory's civil aircraft industry caused by sub-
sidies of another signatory.8 7 Yet Article 6 does contain some apparent weak-
81. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405, T.I.A.S. No. 9616.
82. Id. at art. 4.1.
83. Id. at art. 4.2.
84. Id. at art. 4.3.
85. Id. at art. 4.4.
86. See, for example, the preamble to the Civil Aircraft Agreement, where the signatories specifi-
cally noted their desire "to eliminate adverse effects on trade in civil aircraft resulting from govern-
mental support in civil aircraft development, production, and marketing while recognizing that such
governmental support, of itself, would not be deemed a distortion of trade." Civil Aircraft Agree-
ment, supra note 2, at preamble.
87. Article 6.1 of the Civil Aircraft Agreement reads:
Signatories note that the provisions of the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of
Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures) apply to trade in civil aircraft. They affirm that in
their participation in, or support of, civil aircraft programs they shall seek to avoid adverse
effects on trade in civil aircraft in the sense of Articles 8.3 and 8.4 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. They also shall take into account the special factors
which apply in the aircraft sector, in particular the widespread governmental support in this
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nesses. The signatories accept no affirmative duty to avoid the distorting effects
of government subsidies and similar support. The governments merely agree to
"seek to avoid" such impacts. The lack of affirmative duty stands in contrast to
the duties in other provisions of the Civil Aircraft Agreement.88 Furthermore, as
stated in the Preamble, the signatories recognize that this is an industrial sector
with a traditionally high level of governmental involvement, particularly in the
financing of projects. Some governmental involvement in the civil aircraft indus-
try appears to be permitted under Article 6 as a "special factor" for the signato-
ries to take into account.
Article 6.2 of the Civil Aircraft Agreement addresses the issue of pricing
aircraft under cost. 9 If Boeing's allegations against Airbus are true, AI-support-
ing governments are in violation of Article 6.2 since the parties agree there that
pricing of civil aircraft will be based on a reasonable expectation of recoupment
of all costs. This is another policy goal which the U.S. could not have achieved
through its own national laws alone. Only by international agreement could the
U.S. achieve the prohibition of pricing under cost.
C. Review and Enforcement Under the Civil Aircraft Agreement
The changing nature of the large civil aircraft industry necessitates regular
review of the Civil Aircraft Agreement's terms to ensure their adequacy in
covering the major policy issues in this industry. Article 8 provides for this
review by establishing a Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft composed of
representatives of all signatories. The Committee is required to meet at least
annually to give the signatories an opportunity to review performance under the
Civil Aircraft Agreement. 90 Any signatory can request the Committee to review
area, their international economic interests, and the desire of producers of all Signatories to
participate in the expansion of the world civil aircraft market.
Id. at art. 6.1.
88. See, e.g., id. at art. 2.1 (eliminating customs duties), art. 4.2, (prohibition of unreasonable
pressure on purchasers), art. 5.1 (prohibition of application of quantitative restrictions).
89. Article 6.2 of the Civil Aircraft Agreement reads as follows:
Signatories agree that pricing of civil aircraft should be based on a reasonable expectation of
recoupment of all costs, including non-recurring program costs, identifiable and pro-rated
costs of military research and development on aircraft, components, and systems that are
subsequently applied to the production of such civil aircraft, average production costs, and
financial costs.
Id. at art. 6.2.
90. Article 8 of the Civil Aircraft Agreement, gives the signatories a chance through the
Committee
to consult on any matters relating to the operation of this Agreement, including developments
in the civil aircraft industry, to determine whether amendments are required to ensure continu-
ance of free and undistorted trade, to examine any matter for which it has not been possible to
find a satisfactory solution through bilateral consultations, and to carry out such respon-
sibilities as are assigned to [the Committee] under this Agreement, or by the Signatories.
Id. at art. 8.
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action by another signatory if such action adversely affects the former's "trade
interests in civil aircraft manufacture, repair, maintenance, rebuilding, modifica-
tion or conversion." 9' The Committee is then required to convene within thirty
days and to reach a resolution of the issues involved "as promptly as possible and
in particular prior to final resolution of these issues elsewhere." 92 The Committee
may issue rulings and recommendations. The Committee's resolution does not
prejudice the rights of the signatories under the GATT or multilateral instruments
negotiated under the auspices of the GATT as these instruments affect trade in
civil aircraft, In addition to these dispute resolution provisions, Article 8.8
applies the provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT and the provisions of
the Understanding related to Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance to any disputes relating to matters covered by the Civil Aircraft
Agreement.
As long as fierce competition between Boeing and Al continues, there is a
significant benefit in having a permanent committee to examine performance of
Agreement obligations. Either party can bring a complaint of a particular alleged
violation to the Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft. In its short history, the
Committee has already served as a forum for negotiations on alleged treaty
violations by Boeing's competitors. 93 If a negotiated settlement cannot be reached
or is unsuccessful, a signatory can always impose countervailing duties under
GATT if the procedural requirements are met. 94
D. The Commonline Agreement
The Civil Aircraft Agreement leaves a number of unanswered questions, such
as the degree of subsidization which will be tolerated, allowable terms of financ-
ing, and the extent to which any governmental involvement in the sale of aircraft
will be permitted. Further negotiations to answer these specific questions are
necessary if the international regulatory framework is to continue to address the
industry's current and future problems.
An example of this second tier of negotiations is the commonline agreement.
The commonline entered into force in October, 1981 as an exchange of letters by
France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany.95 The com-
91. Id. at art. 8.7.
92. Id.
93. Hearings, supra note 27, at 409. The Committee on Civil Aircraft has also been helpful as a
forum for extending the scope of the Civil Aircraft Agreement. See, e.g., 20 U.S. EXPORT WK.
(BNA) 180 (Nov. 1, 1983) (describing the Committee's recent work in extending the ban on duties to
more items of aircraft equipment).
94. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1982). U.S. procedures require, in part, a finding by the Secretary of
the Treasury or other administering authority that a subsidy is being used in a product which is being
imported into the U.S., and a finding by the International Trade Commission that the industry is
materially injured, threatened with material injury, or materially retarded because of the imports. The
Civil Aircraft Agreement requires that consultations among the Committee members be initiated if a
signatory imposes countervailing duties without first seeking consultations with the other signatories.
Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 8.6.
95. The information on the commonline terms found in the text is taken primarily from a copy of
the U.S. letter sent to one of the European participants to the agreement. The reasons why the
commonline agreement was never officially put into treaty form have to do with European Commu-
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monline's scope was purposely limited to the particularly troublesome area of
financing in order to provide the participating countries the opportunity to agree
upon specific details of financing arrangements. Agreement was reached in the
establishment of a minimum 12 percent interest rate for officially supported
funds 96 used in aircraft purchases. The parties also agreed to set a maximum ten-
year repayment period for export credits. 97
The specific nature of these agreements complements the broad scope of the
Civil Aircraft Agreement. Narrow agreements aid in defining the limits of the
broader GATT treaty, thereby facilitating compliance with the Civil Aircraft
Agreement. Specific international agreements such as the commonline also bind
nations to particular details of an industrial policy without a full-blown treaty
under GATT.98 The entire membership of GATT need not become involved in an
issue when only a handful of countries have something at stake. Narrowly
focused multilateral agreements also permit the nations involved to accommodate
as nearly as possible the interests of each participant, 99 due to the small number
of participating countries and the narrow scope of the issues involved.
The commonline has yet to become, however, an institutionalized policy-
making tool. 100 The difficulties which the four countries encounter in modifying
nity law. Since transportation policy is an exclusive area of competence of the Community, such an
agreement, if it were in the form of a treaty, probably would have to be negotiated by the European
Commission on behalf of the entire EEC.
96. Denominated in dollars.
97. The 10-year repayment period was a major concession to the United States. The United States
wanted to extend this period, since the other countries find it difficult to meet such long repayment
periods in their financing arrangements. This does seem to be a worthwhile concession, however,
especially in light of the fact that the commonline forced the European governments in certain cases
to increase their interest rates by as much as 4.5 percentage points. See Agreement Nears on Export
Subsidies, AvIATION WK. SPACE TECH., May 30, 1983, at 217.
98. In the area of financing particularly, where interest rates fluctuate continually, it is important
that nations have appropriate policy-making tools to accommodate such change. To the author's
knowledge, there have been no reported violations of the commonline terms despite this absence of
treaty formality.
99. There are a number of examples in the commonline itself of such accommodation of interests
of particular countries. The repayment of officially supported financing in Europe is traditionally
spread over the entire life of the financing. The U.S. practice is to spread the repayment over only the
later maturities of the financing. To accommodate this difference without necessitating change in
these practices, the parties to the commonline agreed to establish different ceilings on the permitted
amount of officially supported fixed-interest rate financing for each aircraft purchased. The com-
monline also allowed Germany and France to loan money at interest rates slightly below the basic rate
of 12 percent, so the German and French Governments could use their respective currencies instead of
the dollar as a component of their financing arrangements. Currencies other than the dollar were used
to avoid the foreign exchange risks involved in foreign currency contracts.
100. Although the commonline is a rather recent agreement and is not institutionalized, agreement
dealing specifically with financing terms in the subsonic aircraft industry dates back to May 1975. At
that time, the members of the OECD concluded what later became known as the Standstill Agree-
ment. In their declaration of 1975, the members agreed that "for exports of subsonic aircraft and
helicopters, they will not grant softer terms than their current practices." American and Foreign
Practices in the Financing of Large Commercial Aircraft Sales: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1978) (statement of John L.
Moore, Jr.). The OECD members interpreted the Standstill Agreement to require terms not exceeding
90 percent financing and 10-year maturities. TWelve-year maturities were allowed in the case of
leases. Id.
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financing terms alone are some indication of this fact.' 0' Furthermore, countries
involved in the large civil aircraft industry have yet to apply the narrow multi-
lateral approach to issues other than financing. Nevertheless, the commonline
agreement has proved to be a valuable tool in setting industrial policy on an issue
extremely important in the civil aircraft industry.0 2
IV. CONCLUSION
Fluctuations in the health of the world economy make it difficult to predict
precisely future changes in the large civil aircraft industry.0 3 Some fundamental
trends, however, are evident. The policies responsible for the great success of Al
in the 1970s are no longer appropriate for the tight budgets of the 1980s. These
budgetary restrictions imposed by the separate participating European govern-
ments have, in turn, adversely affected the unitary approach to competition
against Boeing which Al's legal structure encouraged. European legislation on
this matter would act to reinforce this unitary approach. Economic and structural
difficulties within the Community itself and the simple divergence of interests
among the member states, however, make such legislation unlikely in the near
future. On the other hand, the formation of a European Export Bank does
represent one possible compromise solution. Such an institution would allow the
European manufacturers to compete against the Americans who are aided by the
Export-Import Bank.
The fierce competition between Al and Boeing will continue to define the
manufacturing side of the industry for some years to come. There will perhaps be
some minor changes in the make-up of the competitors,'°0 but the major battle for
101. The four countries agreed to hold to the commonline terms until September 30, 1982. They
also agreed to semi-annual review of these commonline terms. By that date, however, the parties were
unable to reach agreement on modifications to the terms, and simply decided to extend the com-
monline to December 31, 1982. Mann, U.S. Agrees to Lengthen Pact On Export Subsidies, AVIATION
WK. SPACE TECH., Oct. 4, 1982, at 36. In January 1983, the four countries could not agree to
modifications and, as an alternative, again extended the terms until the parties were able to discuss
further modifications at a Paris meeting the following month. AVIATION WK. SPACE TECH., Feb. 14,
1983, at 15. The Paris meeting produced no commonline modifications, so the parties extended the
agreement's deadline further to April 1983. U.S., Airbus Nations Extend Subsidy Pact, AVIATION
WK. SPACE TECH., Mar. 14, 1983, at 265. The parties ultimately extended the commonline without
modification until September 1983. AvIATION WK. SPACE TECH., July II, 1983, at 13.
102. The fact that the four countries to the commonline have extended their agreement so many
times is some indication of the value placed on this policy-making tool. In reference to the financing
terms established in the commonline, Exim Bank president and chairman William H. Draper Ill said
after the parties extended the commonline the first time, "Nobody wanted to just go to anarchy."
Mann, U.S. Agrees to Lengthen pact On Export Subsidies, AVIATION WK. SPACE TECH., Oct. 4,
1982, at 36.
103. The effect of these fluctuations is reflected in the debate over the need for a 150-seat aircraft.
Both Airbus and Boeing have hesitantly made commitments in this area. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 28,
1983, at Dl, col. 3 (city ed.); Putka, Boeing Rise Bucks Market Trend on Buy Signal By Analysts
Expecting Jet Replacement Orders, Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1984, at col. 3.
104. The major new entrant will be the Japanese. They already contribute to about 15 percent of the
Boeing 767. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Fuji Heavy Industries, and the
Japan Aircraft Development Corp. have entered into an agreement with Boeing concerning the
possible construction of an aircraft to compete with the A320 sometime in the late 1980's or early
1990's. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1984, at Dl, col. I (city ed.).
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markets will be fought between these two enterprises. Despite, or perhaps be-
cause of, this competition, Airbus, Boeing, and their respective governments are
realizing that their interests overlap in many significant policy areas. Both sides
are coming to realize that competition's virtues are limited in an interdependent
world.
With Al's and Boeing's interests no longer cleanly separated but inextricably
intertwined, the manufacturers and their respective governments can no longer
afford to ignore the international policy-making option for this industry. Purely
national policies must be coordinated with each other to accommodate the grow-
ing international scope of this industry. Effective regulation, control, and produc-
tive cooperation in this industry require coherent international industrial policy.
Whether the broad treaty arrangement of the Civil Aircraft Agreement and the
narrower multilateral agreements in this industry will be successful in enhancing
cooperation and control in the industry remains to be seen. The arrangements
currently in force lay a solid foundation for an international industrial policy in
the large civil aircraft industry. They have addressed many of the industry's
problems of the past; participants hope they will prevent such problems in the
future. If competition between AI and Boeing intensifies, expansion of the com-
monline concept of narrow multilateral agreements may be desirable to cover
troublesome issues in the industry. Should the legal policy-making tools of
treaties and other narrow bilateral and multilateral negotiations fail, the interested
parties will then have to create and apply other legal tools for policy implementa-
tion. In any case, they will not be able to avoid the need in this industry for an
international industrial policy.
